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EVIL AND VAN INWAGEN
Jeff Jordan

A proposition employed in many versions of the evidential
argument from evil is that every evil is necessary, or God does
not exist. This proposition is so widely accepted that we might
dub it the "Standard Claim". In several articles Peter van
Inwagen has argued that the Standard Claim is false. Van
Inwagen's argument depends upon what we might call the UNo
Minimum Claim". In this note I argue that the No Minimum
Claim is either false or implausible.

Theists and nontheists both typically hold that the existence of God is
incompatible with the occurrence of any evil which God need not permit in
order to bring about a greater good, or to prevent an equally bad or worse
evil from occurring. Indeed this view is so widely accepted and so rarely
questioned that we will dub it the "Standard Claim." Expressed briefly,
the Standard Claim asserts that every evil is necessary, or God does not
exist. So, if God exists and the Standard Claim is true, then the class of
pointless evils is empty, since any actual evil would be necessary. Put
another way, the Standard Claim asserts that every instance of evil in a theistic universe must be connected to a good state of affairs that obtains only
if God permits that particular evil.
God we will understand as a title for the individual who is omnipotent,
omniscient, and morally perfect. A theist is anyone who believes that God
exists. Evil is any case of pain or suffering by one or more innocent
beings. Pointless evil is usually understood as pain and suffering which
God need not permit in order to bring about a greater good, or to prevent
the occurrence of a worse or equally bad evil. Necessary evil, then, is any
evil that's not pointless.
In several important articles Peter van Inwagen has argued that the
Standard Claim is false.! He argues, for instance, that:
It is not very plausible to suppose that there is a way in which evil
could be distributed such that (i) that distribution of evil would serve

God's purposes as well as any distribution could and (ii) God's purposes would be less well served by any distribution involving less
evil. (One might as well suppose that if God's purposes require an
impressively tall prophet to appear at a certain time and place, there
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is a minimum height such a prophet could have.} But if there is no
minimum of evil that would serve God's purposes, then one cannot
argue that God is unjust or cruel for not" getting by with less evil" ... 2
Van Inwagen's argument depends upon what we might call the "No
Minimum Claim," which asserts that: 3
P.

for any amount n of pain & suffering which serves divine purpose D, there is an amount n-l which also accomplishes D.

The No Minimum Claim, however, is itself not very plausible. To see this
consider that the No Minimum Claim can be understood in terms of three
different assumptions about the manner in which evil can be quantified.
The first assumption, which we might call the "Benthamite assumption",
asserts that pain and suffering can be individuated in to units measurable
by the whole numbers. The second assumption, what we could dub the
"Eleatic assumption", holds that pain and suffering can be individuated
into units measurable by the real numbers. The third assumption, call it
the "Ordinal assumption", asserts that evil comes not in discrete units but
only unindividuated amounts, that only an ordinal scale and not an interval scale is possible with evil.
Understood as employing the Benthamite assumption, the No
Minimum Claim is false: Let n be 1, then no evil would be necessary to
accomplish D. But this is implausible, since some positive amount of pain
and suffering seems necessary. So, whatever the amount of pain and suffering necessary to accomplish D, it is greater than 1. More generally, if (P)
and the Benthamite assumption are true, then by repeated applications of
(P) to any finite amount of pain and suffering, a zero-amount of pain and
suffering would be necessary for divine purposes. But if there are whole
numbers with which (P) is false, then there is some minimum amount necessary to accomplish D. So, the No Minimum Claim, given the Benthamite
assumption, is false.
On the other hand, if it employs the Eleatic assumption, the No
Minimum Claim is implausible: given the Eleatic assumption, the No
Minimum Claim should be revised as:
P*.

for all amounts of pain and suffering nand m, such that n alone
is insufficient for divine purposes D, but n + m is sufficient for
D, there is an amount n + 0, such that 0 is less than m, which
also accomplishes D.4

(P*) is true only if, for any two units of pain and suffering, r and t, there is
always some third unit s, such that s is distinct from r and from t, and s is
located between r and t. Pain and suffering is, in other words, infinitely
divisible. But the idea that any amount of pain and suffering is infinitely
diminishable is implausible. For one thing, there is a difference between
diminishing something and diminishing something in a morally significant
way. To diminish pain and suffering in a morally significant way requires
a detectable diminishing, but pain and suffering, even if diminishable ad
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infinitum, cannot be diminished in a detectable way ad infinitum. The
human sensory apparatus is coarse and cannot detect amounts of pain and
suffering which might be infinitesimal for example. There is, in other
words, a lower practical limit on the human sensory apparatus' ability to
detect pain and suffering, even if there is no mathematical limit on the
divisibility of whatever it is pain and suffering supervenes upon. So,
diminishing in a morally significant way requires a diminishment above
the lower practical limit.
Perhaps we should understand the No Minimum Claim as employing
the Ordinal assumption, that evil comes not in discrete units but only unindividuated amounts, that only an ordinal scale and not an interval scale is
possible with evil. The No Minimum Claim, under this understanding,
should be revised as:
P'.

for any amount n of pain & suffering which serves divine purpose D, there is an amount n' which is less than n, and which
also accomplishes D.

(P'), however, is no more plausible than (P*). Given that diminishing pain
and suffering in a morally significant way requires a detectable diminishing, then the appeal to (P') is irrelevant. It does not follow from the No
Minimum Claim understood as (P') that for any distribution of evil that
serves divine purposes as well as any other, there is always some other distribution of evil that is detectably less painful than the first distribution,
and which serves divine purposes just as well. That claim would not survive repeated applications of (P'). Keeping in mind that there's a human
sensory threshold, amounts of detectable evil are what's at issue and not
just amounts of evil.
It follows from the above that the No Minimum Claim, whether the
Benthamite assumption, the Eleatic assumption, or the Ordinal assumption
is employed, is either false or implausible. The Standard Claim, then,
remains unscathed by the No Minimum Claim.

University of Delaware
NOTES
1. See his "The Magnitude, Duration, and Distribution of Evil: A
Theodicy" Philosophical Topics 16/2 (1988): 161-87; and his "The Problem of
Evil, the Problem of Air, and the Problem of Silence" Philosophical Perspectives 5,
Philosophy of Religion ed. J. Tomberlin, (1991): 64, n. 11. Both are reprinted in
his God, Knowledge & Mystery: Essays in Philosophical Theology (Ithaca: Cornell
UP, 1995).
2. God, Knowledge & MystcnJ, p. 103.
3. Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder were the first, I believe, to dub van
Inwagen's thesis the "No Minimum Claim". See their "Is Theism Compatible
with Gratuitous Evil?" American Philosophical Quarterly 36/2 (1999): 129.
4. I thank the editor for his suggestion in formulating the Eleatic
Assumption. Another way of expressing the Eleatic Assumption is:
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P**. for any amount of pain & suffering n which serves divine purposes
0, there is an amount nl2 which also accomplishes D.
Expressing the Eleatic Assumption as (P**) may be misleading. Take van
Inwagen's impressively tall prophet, who stands, let's suppose, a full seven
feet. (P**) might be taken to assert that a prophet standing but half that
impressive height could also do the prophetic job.

